We evaluate the sporting effects of the seeding system reform in the major football club tournament -the Champions League -organized by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). In the UEFA Champions League, before the 2015-16 season, the teams were seeded in the group stage with respect to their ratings. Starting from the 2015-16 season, national champions of the Top-7 countries are seeded in the first pot, whereas other teams are seeded by their rating as before. We propose a probabilistic model for predicting the score of a single match in UEFA tournaments as well as the whole UEFA season. This model uses clubs' ratings as inputs. Applying Monte-Carlo simulations, we show that the expected rating of the UEFA Champions League winner, as well as the sum of the finalists' ratings, slightly decreased after the reform. At the same time, the difference in the finalists' ratings, which is a measure of competitive balance, increased. The UEFA Europa League became stronger and less balanced. We check the robustness of the results by introducing local fluctuations in the clubs ratings. Also, we study which national associations took advantage of the reform. For seeding rules before and after the reform, we estimate the transition matrix (p ij ), where p ij is the probability of i-th strongest national association moving to j-th position after the season. The effect of reform on a single national association measured by the change in probability to increase or decrease the association's UEFA rank is not more than 3%.
Introduction
In September, 2013, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), a European football governing body, decided to change the format of European football club tournaments starting from the 2015-16 season. One of the most important changes was the establishing a new seeding system for the UEFA Champions League. The short-term effect of the new seeding policy was that the quantitative characteristics of single matches, as well as whole tournament characteristics, changed. At the club level, some teams will benefit from the reform as they will face weaker opponents during the group stage. At the national association level, some countries will have an increased probability of moving up in the rankings, thus, increasing the number of representatives that they field in international UEFA tournaments.
Our research aims to evaluate the expected sporting effects of the reform using computer simulation techniques.
Each season, UEFA organizes two major international club competitions: the UEFA Champions League, the most prestigious tournament, and the UEFA Europa League, the second most prestigious. All 54 national associations -UEFA members -receive a certain number of places in these tournaments, based on UEFA's ranking of the respective national associations. Each national association then determines the teams that will enter the international European competitions based on domestic tournament results -standings from the domestic championship and domestic cup.
1 Clubs enter the Champions League and the Europa league at different stages of the tournament depending on both the country's position in the UEFA ranking of national associations and the club's own achievements in domestic competitions. A full list for the 2015-16 season is provided in the Appendix (see Table 1 ).
The European Cups have the following structure. Both the Champions League and the Europa League are made up of four qualifying rounds, followed by a group stage and a concluding play-off tournament. In every qualifying round and the play-off round, each team faces a single opponent. They play two games -a home and an away match (the only exception is the final which is played at a pre-determined neutral stadium). The winner is determined on the aggregate score. In the Europa League, the winner of these knock-out matches qualifies for the next round and the loser goes home. The same is true for the first two qualifying rounds and the play-off round of the Champions League. However, losers in 1 Several national associations hold more tournaments. For example, there are two cups in England: the Football Association Challenge Cup and the Football League Cup. Winners of both tournaments automatically get a place in the UEFA Europa League.
the 3 rd and 4 th Champions League qualifying rounds are not completely eliminated: these teams enter the Europa League 4 th qualifying round, and group stage, respectively.
In both tournaments, the group stage is made up of several groups of 4 teams (8 groups in the Champions League, 12 groups in the Europa League). In each group, teams play a double round-robin tournament. That is, each team faces each other 2 times -a home and an away match. A win counts for 3 points, a draw -1 point, a loss -0 points. After all matches are completed, the teams are ranked based on the total number of points from the 6 group matches. The first two teams in the group advance to the play-off round. The fourth team is eliminated. In the Champions League, the third-place team in the group drops down to the Europa league. In the Europa League, the third-place team in the group is eliminated.
Sorting teams into groups or knock-out matches may be done in many different ways.
However, the quality of the participating teams varies greatly. Hence, two different draws are not equal. The probability of a team advancing further depends significantly on its particular opponents. Without additional protections, the second best team may be eliminated by the best one in the very first round. This is likely an undesirable event for tournament organizers, since spectators prefer watching stronger teams. Hart, Hutton, and Sharot (1975) found that stadium attendance positively correlates with a visiting team's strength. Hence, early elimination of a favourite may reduce overall spectator interest in a tournament. Tournament organizers are interested in a draw procedure that protects stronger teams from being eliminated early. Forrest and Simmons (2002) tested whether match attendance depends on outcome uncertainty. They found that, all else equal, matches that are thought to be intense attract more spectators.
UEFA exploits coefficients 2 that reflect the strength of European clubs and national associations. The are two different coefficient rankings: the UEFA club ranking and the UEFA national association ranking. Club coefficients are used by UEFA for seeding (and, thus, protection) purposes, whereas national association coefficients determine the number of representatives from each association in European club tournaments.
UEFA national association coefficients are calculated in the following way. All clubs participating in the Champions League and Europa League collect points for the national association that they represent. In the qualifying rounds, each win adds 1 point to the association's total, a draw -0.5 points, a loss -0 points. Starting from the group stage, these values increase to 2, 1, and 0, respectively. After the season, the total number of points is divided by the number of participants from this association. The resulting average is the association's yearly coefficient. It is calculated for the last 5 seasons; the sum is the association's 5-year coefficient.
The UEFA club coefficient is calculated in a similar way based on the club's performance in European cups during the last 5 seasons, as well as on the coefficient of the association the club belongs to. Technically, these calculations are more complicated. Additional details are relegated to the Appendix.
In both tournaments, the group stage draw is an important event that determines the contest flow for months. At the draw, UEFA team coefficients are used to protect stronger teams and avoid heterogeneity between groups. Before the 2015-16 season, at the beginning of the draw, participants were split into 4 pots with respect to their coefficients. The only exception was for the title-holder who was guaranteed to be seeded into the first pot, irrespective of their rating. After that, groups were formed by picking 1 team from each of the 4 pots. This procedure guarantees that each group contains a very strong top-8 team and a relatively weak bottom-8 team.
Starting from the 2015-16 season, UEFA changed the seeding procedure. Namely, the first pot comprises the title-holder and the champions of the top-7 countries (or the champions of the top-8 countries, if the title-holder is a champion from one of the top-7 countries). Since a national champion may have a relatively low UEFA coefficient, the changes in the seeding procedure lead to less homogeneous groups. In this paper, we evaluate how the changes affect competitive balance, quality, and other key metrics.
The problem of optimally sorting objects into groups has long been a topic of academic interest. The literature includes both the theoretical studies of sorting properties and applications to various industries. A comprehensive introduction to the mathematical theory of sorting may be found in (Andrews , 1998) . A review of operational research classification and sorting methods is provided in (Zopounidis and Doumpos , 2010) . These techniques may be applied to solve such real-life problems as diagnosing based on the set of symptoms (Stefanowski and Slowiński , 1997) , routing the packages at the post (McWilliams, Stanfield, and Geiger , 2005) , or choosing the sample for sociological interview (see, for example, (Zopounidis and Doumpos , 2010) for more details).
To choose between different partitions, an optimization criterion (or criteria) must be selected. The simplest problem is to maximize the objective function, which is defined explicitly on the set of all partitions. In this case in the tournament seeding context we call the optimized value a tournament success measure. Since a finite number of objects may be split into a finite number of groups in a finite number of ways, one may theoretically evaluate the objective function for each partition and choose the one that maximizes the objective function. In practice, the total number of partitions may be very large, which makes a full search hard (or even impossible). In such situations, one needs to establish properties that significantly shrink the number of alternatives.
Searching for the optimal seeding in a knock-out tournament with 4 participants, given pairwise winning probabilities, Horen and Riezman (1985) consider 3 objective functions:
1) the probability of the strongest team winning the tournament;
2) the probability of the two strongest teams meeting in the final;
3) the expected rating of the winner.
They show that a seeding in which the strongest team faces the weakest team in the semifinal, while the two other teams play each other in the other semifinal, is a solution to each of the three maximization problems. This, however, is not necessarily the case for a knockout tournament with 8 participants. Vu (2010) models tournament revenue with a function that includes game parameters, such as competitive balance and quality. The competitive balance (CB) of a game is the difference in the opponents' strengths always taken with a minus sign (thus, a closer opponent rating corresponds to a more intense game with a higher CB value). The quality (Q) of a game is the sum of the opponents' ratings. As discussed earlier, spectators are more interested in games with greater competitive balance.
At the same time, spectators prefer higher quality games. Aggregating the revenue over all tournament games, we reach the organizers' optimization problem. Simulating parameters of the model for each seeding, Vu found the frequency at which this seeding is optimal. In this paper, we will use competitive balance and quality as the main objectives.
More complicated sorting problems arise when the objective function is given implicitly.
In contest theory, contest organizers are interested in maximizing the overall effort levels exerted by participants in the Nash equilibrium. Following a Tullock contest model (Tullock , 1980) , the contestants independently choose the level of costly efforts. The probability of a win equals the share of the participant's efforts in overall efforts exerted by the players. Baik (2008) considers a contest between N groups of players, N ≥ 2. Similarly, the probability of a group winning equals the share of the group's efforts. If a group wins a contest, each member of the group receives a prize valued at 1. Baik shows that if the cost function is linear on efforts, then, in each group, only the player with the lowest marginal cost of efforts exerts positive efforts. It follows from this fact that effort-maximizing organizers must assign top N players to N different groups; other player assignments do not matter. In the same between-groups contest, Ryvkin (2011) considers general convex cost functions. He shows that under reasonable assumptions, the optimal partition of the contestants into groups either minimizes or maximizes the contestants' strength variance between groups. Note that this problem is different from the one faced by UEFA, because there is no competition between groups in either the Champions League or Europa League.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our simulation models: a model for simulating the outcome of a single match (subsection 2.1), and a model for simulating the whole UEFA season (subsection 2.2). In Section 3 we present the results of the comparison of the two seeding systems (subsection 3.1) and test robustness (subsection 3.2). Section 4 concludes.
The model
In this section, we model the Champions League and Europa League tournaments. First,
we propose a simulation model for a single game in both competitions. Second, we simulate the whole tournament.
Simulation of a single game score
An adequate model is key for making a good prediction about the outcome of a single game between two football teams. After (Maher , 1982) Thus, we suggest the Poisson model for the score of a single game between clubs H (home) and A (away). Denote by n h and n a the number of goals scored by H and A, and by λ h and λ a the mean number of goals scored by H and A, respectively, in a match between them. Suppose that n h and n a follow Poisson distributions with parameters λ h and λ a , respectively, and the corresponding probability mass functions P h (n h ) and P a (n a ) are given as follows:
To choose the model for λ h and λ a , we take into account two empirical observations.
First, the number of goals scored in European international club matches correlates with the difference in the opponents' UEFA coefficients. Second, the home side has an advantage.
Therefore, we consider the following parametric family of models for λ h and λ a :
where R h and R a stand for home and away club ratings, respectively, and α j , β j , γ j , χ j , j ∈ {a, h} are constants determining the model. Now, equations (1) can be rewritten as
MLE
We 
where P m (ῡ) is the estimated probability of the observed score of the match number m (see (3)):
We use Monte-Carlo simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi , 1983) with Metropolis criterion (Beichl and Sullivan , 2000) to find MLE-estimations. The starting values ofῡ are random. On i-th Monte-Carlo step, the new set of parametersῡ i+1 is tested. The new set of parametersῡ i+1 is generated by adding a random normally distributed fluctuation to the previous setῡ i :ῡ
where T M C is Metropolis 'temperature' (it regulates the degree of allowed fluctuations in the system), and σ is a coefficient, the value of which is chosen to obtain a mean acceptance ratio equal to 0.5. The step acceptance probability is equal to p M C = exp
During optimization, we decreased T M C from 10 6 to 10 −5 in 10 6 steps, which corresponds to a random walk in the parameter space at the beginning of optimization and negligibly small parameter fluctuations in the end.
Since scores follow a Poisson distribution, λ h and λ a must always be positive; parameters υ that lead to negative λ h or λ a are considered invalid. During Monte-Carlo optimization, we used only valid sets of parametersῡ. New fluctuations (and, thus, new sets of parameter values) were generated at each step until a valid set was obtained. These values lead to an average value for home and away teams equal to 1.51 and 1.10, respectively, which is close to the real-life average values 1.65 and 1.01.
Simulation of UEFA season outcome
According to the above-mentioned model, each match is a random process. The UEFA season comprises hundreds of games. Thus, any particular outcome of the season is a coincidence of many random variable realisations. In such complex systems, even for very simple events, it is difficult to find exact probabilities. To find the empirical probability distributions for these events, one may accumulate statistics from multiple independent runs. This technique, called Monte-Carlo simulations, can be treated as averaging multiple measured values. The more Monte-Carlo trials one completes, the less errors of averaged values will be obtained (typically, the error S ∼ √ K, in which K is the number of trials).
We estimated how errors in tournament success measures (expected rating of the winner, expected competitive balance in the final, expected quality of the final, and others) depend on the number of runs in simulations 3 . We produced simulations with 10 3 to 10 7 runs, 10 times each. For each particular number of runs, we calculated unbiased sample variance of the average values of the tournament success measures. Then, we converted it to relative errors (see Fig. 2 ). At first glance, the relative error drops down quickly, and even 10 3 -10 4 runs are enough to estimate results. However, our primary goal was to estimate the difference between the two seeding policies that produce relatively similar data and, thus, high errors.
Therefore, we produced our primary simulations and robustness check simulations with 10 for the probability of the top team winning the Champions League. 3 Results and discussion
Main results
In the literature (see, for example, Horen and Riezman, 1985; Scarf, Yousof and Bilbao, 2009 ), the following quantities are often regarded as tournament success measures: the 3 The stochastic part of the observational error is meant. The k th simulation run is treated as a single measurement x k of a certain tournament success measure. As we estimate average valuesx of this tournament success measure across all possible outcomes, the resulting error of the average value is an estimation of the feasible difference between the measured average and the true average, calculated as an unbiased sample variance:
2 . The relative error is s(x) = S(x) ·x −1 .
expected rating of the winner, the expected quality of the final (the sum of the finalists' ratings), and the expected competitive balance of the final (the difference between the finalists' ratings).
Figures 3-5 illustrate the changes with respect to these parameters after the adoption of the new seeding system. The expected rating of the winner decreased slightly after the reform from 157.2 to 157.1 (-0.1%). The expected quality of the final decreased from 300.5 to 299.6 (-0.3%). This decrease is due to the lower probability of top clubs reaching the final stages of the tournament. The intuition behind this is rather strict: under the new seeding system, there is a higher probability of drawing two very strong teams into one group. Thus, the probability that one or both of them will fail to qualify for the knock-out stage increases.
At the same time, the expected competitive balance of the final worsened from -30.0 to -30.7, which means a less competitive match by approximately 2.4%. The probability of a final between two low-ranked teams increased. However, this difference is much less than the increase in the probability of a final between a low-ranked and a high-ranked team.
The changes in the Champions League seeding system indirectly affected the Europa League. The expected rating of the Europa League winner increased from 95.4 to 96.9, and the expected quality of the final increased from 179.7 to 182.1 (+1.5% and +1.3%, respectively). As for expected competitive balance in the final, it fell from -26.5 to -27.1 making the Europa League final less competitive by 2.2%. All in all, after the reform, both tournaments acquired less competitive finals, and the Europa League winners became closer in strength to the Champions League winners. Another issue is ranking dynamics in European football. At the national association level, one may think of ranking stability as a matrix (p ij ), where p ij is the probability of a country ranked i moving to position j after the season (i, j = 1, . . . , 54). For example, the unit matrix corresponds to absolutely stable systems, in which rankings after the next season are predetermined. Both excessive stability and instability lead to economic ineffectiveness.
Based on 2015-16 season inputs, we calculated the ranking stability matrices (p ij ) for the current and previous systems, and study their common properties and differences. Figure   6 shows the effect of the reform on the countries' positions. The overall influence of the seeding changes on a country's ranking may be estimated to be at most 3%. The new rules favoured Italy and Netherlands, because they got one first-pot representative (Juventus and PSV, respectively), instead of none. As a result, Italy reduced by almost 3% the probability of dropping down to fifth place, and the Netherlands reduced by nearly 2% the probability of dropping down to ninth place. Other changes are close to zero.
Testing the model's robustness
The results presented above were obtained based on certain club ratings. We need to separate the role of the tournament structure itself from dependency on the initial dataset. To deal Figure 6 : The difference in probabilities (the new system minus the old system) to move up or move down in the ranking. The absolute error of the probability difference values is 2.5 · 10 −4 , shown with a light red stripe.
with this point, we developed a robustness test procedure. We varied the clubs' initial ratings, while keeping clubs' and countries' initial rankings fixed. We produced the same simulations with the old and new seeding procedures, using randomly modified input ratings (called hereinafter "setup"). We examined the stability of the resulting shifts in metrics between the two seeding procedures over the amplitude of the clubs' rating fluctuations.
Algorithm for a random rating setup generation
One of the simplest and most natural ways to apply random fluctuations to club ratings is to add a random normally distributed perturbation to each club's rating. However, the ratings of clubs participating in the UEFA Champions League and Europa League are very close, so adding random fluctuations may lead to a ranking change. Thus, we used only such fluctuations in the clubs' ratings that preserved rankings. The algorithm utilizes a userdefined amplitude of fluctuations A and produces a random setup in the following steps:
1. Clubs are sorted according to their true rating R = (R 1 , ..., R C ), where R c is the coefficient of the c-th strongest club, c = 1, ..., C.
2. For each club n, except the one with the lowest rating, the difference to the next club that has a lower rating is calculated as: ∆R c = R c − R c+1 .
3. The new rating is generated by the equations:
where ξ is a (0,1)-normally distributed random variable. For each club, ξ value is re-generated until (1.00 + ξA) is positive.
4. After the new rating R * is generated for each club, the ratings are normalized to the initial sum of the ratings:
The rankings of the clubs remain the same in this procedure. We have varied fluctuation amplitude A from 0.03 to 10, and generated 100 random setups per value (also called "setup samplings", or "samplings"). We calculated the dispersion of the normalized disturbed ratingR * for each club in each sample. The dependency of the relative dispersions on A is plotted in Fig. 7 . There are two important observations. First, the relative dispersion in each sampling remains at nearly the same level for all clubs, except for the clubs with the lowest rating. The increased relative dispersion in the lowest rating region appears due to the rapid increase in ∆R R ratio because R is close to zero. Second, one can see the saturation of dispersion values at A ≈ 3. Thus the conditions of simultaneously We produced the simulations for every setup of every sampling. For each setup, we calculated the changes in the expected rating of the winner (R new , R old ), the expected quality of the final (Q new , Q old ) and the expected competitive balance of the final (CB new , CB old ) for both the new and old seeding procedures: 
Conclusions
We estimated the changes in competitiveness in the UEFA Champions League and Europa 
Appendix
Appendix contains supplementary information on the UEFA tournaments format and rankings.
National association coefficient
All clubs participating in the Champions League and Europa League collect points for the national association they represent. In the qualifying rounds, each win adds 1 point to the association's total, a draw -0.5 points, a loss -0 points. Starting from the group stage, these numbers are 2, 1 and 0, respectively. After the season, the total number of points is divided by the number of participants from this association. The resulting average is the association's yearly coefficient. It is calculated over the last 5 seasons; the sum is an association's 5-year coefficient. points, in the 3 rd qualifying round -1 point, in the 4 th qualifying round -1.5 points.
Club coefficient

Access list
Below we use the following abbreviations:
• GS -group stage;
• NCQ3(NCQ4) -non-champions qualifying round 3 (4);
• CQ3(CQ4) -champions qualifying round 3 (4);
• CH -national champion;
• CW -national cup winner;
• Nx -x-placed team in the national championship;
• FP -National Fair-Play ranking leader. 
